

**EC Project:
The Landscape and Isobars of European Values in
Relation to Science and New Technology
(ValueIsobars)**

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**Towards a pragmatically justified theory of
values for governance
Conceptual analysis of values, norms, preferences and attitudes**

Work package 1

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Deliverable 2

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1. Introduction: Towards a pragmatically justified theory of values for governance

The project *Value Isobars* identifies an important gap in European governance of science and technology (S&T) (Value Isobars project description, p. 7): The gap between the importance of people's values for their attitudes to S&T on the one side and the little knowledge there is on the concept of social values on the other side. It can be safely stated that values are recognized as important drivers of people's attitudes towards S&T. As the acceptance of S&T strongly depends on value-based attitudes, values need to be addressed in European policy making and should be integrated into a deliberative democratic culture. The Eurobarometer report "Social Values, Science and Technology" concluded that the "challenge of science and technology decision-makers is to pursue the pace of developments made while accounting for the ethical aspects which Europeans feel so strongly attached to" (Eurobarometer 2005, p. 99). But actually there is a gap between the broad attention to social values in public, political and academic debates and the substantive amount of ignorance of the conceptual and methodological means to understand what values are; how strongly they are embedded within social identities; how they relate to overt attitudes to S&T; how changes of values come about or how policy can address them (Value Isobars project description, p. 7).

Value Isobars, therefore, intends to provide EU policy-makers with tools to identify those values that crucially inform people's attitudes to science and technology and to introduce them in the governance of S&T. The main questions are i) how strongly values are embedded within social identities; ii) how they relate to overt attitudes to S&T; iii) how changes of values come about or how policy can address them. The overall goal of the Value Isobars project is to sketch a blueprint of a more coherent, flexible and dynamic conception of a value-based governance of S&T.

Work package (WP) 1 explores and reviews conceptual issues concerning the notion of values in general and with regard to the field of S&T. It is based on extensive literature reviews both of scholarly literature and of public documents (governments, NGOs etc.) dealing with values in and for S&T. The work will assimilate and summarise important developments and theorising within such diverse fields as philosophy, law, sociology, theology, economics and psychology. The historical roots and major contributions towards theories of values shall be explored and analysed in comparison and with an additional focus on the notion of 'European' values. The diverse approaches will be contrasted and analysed in regard to problematic presuppositions and constraints with a focus on values *in, of* and *with regard to* S&T, among others taking into account ethical vs. political/policy theories with regard to the governance of S&T and values.

The question will be asked how these theories relate to a general understanding of human action and attitude. In particular, the analytic differences between values on the one hand and rules (norms, institutions, and principles), propositional attitudes (preferences, wishes, desires) and virtues on the other hand will be a focus of attention. Questions of what distinguishes moral values from other values such as social, theoretical or aesthetical values, and how this relates to ethical theory and practical ethics will be pursued. An overview of value concepts and the main parameters of interaction shall be provided. The possible

interaction of values with emerging, more permanent attitudes, in regard to governance of S&T, will be explored. A preliminary, policy-oriented generic framework for a unified and comprehensive theory is the overall goal of this work package. It shall comprise the overview of value concepts, of parameters and their interdependence, an identification of main field of value-conflicts and of shared values with regard to S&T and ideas of (a) understanding, (b) communicating, and (c) handling these “landscapes” of values.

In the second deliverable (D2), we build on previous terminological and conceptual work. From deliverable 1 (D1), we take up the points that seem necessary for our argumentation (1). In a chapter on evaluation (2), we investigate the crucial relationship of values, attitudes and preferences. And finally, we start to sketch an ethics of values (3) that is meant to lay the grounds for a pragmatically justified theory of values for governance. In this respect, we continue our discussion of the relationship between values and norms.

Looking at D2 more in detail, we will first assess the relationship of values to attitudes and preferences. Although they are very often used synonymously, one intuitively believes that they are not the same. In D1, we stated that values and preferences are systematically not on the same level as we can use values to evaluate preferences. The same applies to attitudes. While our intuition that values, attitudes and preferences are not the synonymous can build on good philosophical grounds, they have a common point of intersection: evaluations. Value, attitudes and preferences can be related to evaluations in different ways. Therefore, we will have a closer look at that. There is also a disciplinary aspect that differentiates values from attitudes and preferences. While social sciences use attitudes to explain and predict individual or collective behaviour, in moral philosophy values understood as reference points of evaluations are used for justification. Preferences are selection criteria for decisions or actions. Preference orders are in principle based on normative criteria that do not have to be reflected and explicit. With the help of preferences, social scientists are able to explain why an individual or collective actor preferred one to another alternative. In contrast, moral philosophers would evaluate preferences by referring to values or norms. Analysing the relationship of values, attitudes and preference can therefore serve normative and empirical purposes.

After discussing the relationship between values, attitudes and preferences, we sketch an ethics of values which deals with the challenges when translating values into norms. Regarding values and norms, in public debates, they are very often used as a pair. However, there is an important difference between both: “[...] norms are directly action-guiding whereas values are not” (Grüne-Yanoff/Hansson 2009, p. 162). By referring mainly to the works of Hans Joas (2000, 2005) we stated in D1 that values are attractive as they motivate us for action but without telling what to do in a specific moment, while norms are both obligatory without respect of person and restrictive, as they might rule out courses and aims of action. In philosophy and political ethics, the relationship of norms and values was widely debated between liberal and communitarian scholars. While the first ones (most prominently Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls) advocated in a Kantian tradition the normative universalism of the right that is obligatory for all, others (such as Charles Taylor or Alisdair MacIntyre) stressed in a Neo-Aristotelian tradition plural value orders of a good life (Jung 2007, p. 68; there are also suggestions s, e.g. by Martha Nussbaum). This issue goes into the heart of the discussion how to create value-based governance. We have to find ethical means to deal with a plurality of values, to check their validity and to translate them into norms – be it hard or soft law –

that are binding to all norm addressees. As WP1, we do not repeat the turf battles between liberals and communitarians but follow several suggestions for bridging the two as represented by the later work of Taylor or Joas or Martha Nussbaum, even Habermas now holds a more moderate position (Joas 2000, Jung 2007).

As already explained in D1, one can look at values from an empirical descriptive perspective and ask what are the values held in a certain group, how values change etc. However, if values are to be meant as the basis of governance we need to be more explicit about what a value actually means, how it relates to other values and how we can universalise values in a dialogue in order to obtain morally and legally binding norms. Individuals and social groups feel bound to their values. Acting in accordance with their values they behave in consonance with their own self-conception, in a way they want to see themselves. Values are therefore strong intrinsic motivators. In contrast, as norms have an obligatory character they do not presuppose an inner commitment: The addressees of a norm have to comply whether or not they like it. Therefore, one has to proceed carefully when translating a value into a norm.

In this respect D2 serves as an intermediary link between the conceptual work what values are on the one side and a sketch of pragmatically justified theory of values for governance on the other side. This means a further elaboration of the value-norm-translation by combining it with the governance approach in general and applying it to governance of S&T and our two test cases in particular. This will be done in the next deliverable. We will however give first hints in this paper.

2. Basic philosophical value concepts and their implications

Reviewing the literature on values we explained the genesis of the concept of value in 19th century German philosophy and showed how different value ethical approaches conceptualised the value term and the cognitive and intellectual ways of realising values. Especially the *formal* and the *material value ethical approaches* tried to find ways and means to reject the philosophical insight that values have a subjective and a contingent nature. Values depend in one way or another on moral subjects that feel bound to them. Whether or not values exist independently from these subjects was a matter of debate.

For the purposes of Value Isobars, it has been pointed out that value ethical approaches claiming an eternal existence of fixed values independent of time and space are not apt for *Value Isobars* that has to deal with contingent values in and of Europe. Based on philosophical literature, we therefore suggested regarding values as the reference points of evaluations. They serve as criteria for evaluations of what an evaluator finds good or bad, brave or coward etc. Values as ideals or criteria are detached from single evaluations. By rejecting value objectivist positions as inadequate for the purposes of Value Isobars, we do not put the case for value relativist or value subjectivist positions either. In the course of the project, we have to find a way to deal with a plurality of values in and of Europe on the one hand, and the observation that some values pre-exist individually made experiences on the other hand.

One has to add that there are not only the mentioned pragmatic reasons to opt for the suggested use of values but also meta-ethical objections against positions that regard values as something that exists out there in an ideal world independently from time, space and moral subjects. John Mackie, for instance, rejects such value ethical concepts with the “argument for queerness”

that has an ontological and epistemological strand (Mackie 1977, 38; Ott 2001, p. 40-1; Joyce 2007, Joas 2008):

“The first states that our conception of a moral property is essentially one of a very unusual kind of property, such that countenancing its instantiation requires us to posit in the world “qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe” (Mackie 1977: 38). The second states that in order to track such weird properties we would need “some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else” (ibid.). These are not independent arguments, since we are forced to posit weird epistemological equipment only if it has already been established that the properties in question are weird.” (Joyce 2007)

While Mackies' position can be criticised for its questionable implicit empiricism, it can serve as a starting point to clarify the metaethical position of WP1.

After comparing different concepts from the perspective of descriptive ethics or moral sociology, we suggested an understanding of values that allows for i) satisfying philosophical demands, ii) meeting non-academic common usages of the term and iii) investigating European values. This not only made it possible to distinguish the term value from other related terms but also to classify the different types of values. The important distinction of philosophical and social values was achieved. We suggested the following definition of value: Values *motivate* our actions, *give orientation* and are *reference points of our evaluations*. We *feel bound to them rationally and emotionally*.

We then introduced the concept of a value landscape that follows the idea of a moral landscape developed by Charles Taylor (Taylor 1985). He uses a spatial metaphor to illustrate how people relate to their values and how they built up to a moral space which consists of a net of corresponding situational perceptions, courses of action, emotions and self-conceptions (Rosa 1996, p. 112-4). In it, people find orientation with the help of a moral map located on which are individual value convictions. Rosa (1996, p. 114) explains that individuals do not only need an intact map but also the ability to locate themselves in it. This location takes the shape of a narrative reconstruction of their life and alludes to the image of a road of life. A moral map gives information about the self-conception, biography and futures aims and desires of an individual. He or she can ask him- or herself whether that is the life that he or she has always wanted to live. However, a moral map is never prefixed. It develops in the process of orientation and serves as a starting point for new experiences and considerations (Mandry 2009, p. 147-8).

For Value Isobars, this is helpful in at least two respects. First, questions about values arise in concrete situations and refer to a whole net of values. We can therefore assume that in policy situations we do not have to deal with single values but with clusters of interrelated values. Second, values are part of a narrative: Individuals or groups tell themselves about where they come from, where they want to go to and how their ideal world would look like.

In Taylor's value ethical approach the distinction between weak and strong evaluations feature centrally.¹ They give an answer to the question whether we choose to evaluate our desires on

¹ Taylor distinguishes weak and strong evaluations. They give an answer to the question whether we choose to evaluate our desires on the basis of contingent or categorical reasons (Joas 2000, p. 128). In case of weak evaluations, we reflect how to realise our desires best or most efficiently while in the case of strong evaluations, we ask for the motivation why we satisfy or reject a desire. We articulate strong evaluations in terms of oppositions such as important and unimportant, higher or lower, brave or coward, noble or common.

the basis of contingent or categorical reasons (Taylor 1985, pp. 18-9; Joas 2000, p. 128). In case of weak evaluations, we reflect how to realise our desires best or most efficiently while in the case of strong evaluations, we ask for the motivation why we satisfy or reject a desire. We articulate strong evaluations in terms of oppositions such as important and unimportant, higher or lower, brave or coward, noble or common. These pairs constitute a moral space, a net of corresponding situational perceptions, courses of action, emotions and self-conceptions (Rosa 1996, p. 112-4). In it, people find orientation with the help of a moral map located on which are our individual value convictions. Jung (2007, p. 72) takes a very firm stance by stating that only in the case of strong evaluations, that are related to the self-conception of an evaluator, one can seriously speak of values.

According to Taylor, the ability to articulate strong evaluation plays a crucial role. In moral feelings such as guilt, shame or fulfilment individuals first encounter strong evaluations but in order to reflect them they have to be articulated – even though this articulation will never entirely be conform with the emotions and experiences associated with a value. For the former work of Value Isobars, this provides two important insights. First, strong evaluations have to be linguistically expressed in order to serve as means to evaluate intentions, courses and aims of action. Articulation, furthermore, is the precondition for a successful dialogue on values and their meaning for individuals or groups. Second, there are hierarchies of evaluations and values either.

Finally, we approached the question of values in society by looking at what we might understand by social values on the one hand and by European values on the other hand and by making first steps into placing values in governance. We suggested an understanding of social values – in contrast to philosophical values – as not only contingent but also rather (*prima facie*) non-argumentative attributes of individuals and groups. This is not to say that social values are non-rational or even irrational, but the level of analysis and explicit reflexion simply is different from a philosophical discourse where argumentative validity ('Gültigkeit') of values is sought, despite their actual prevalence in society. One could also say that philosophical values are treated by moral philosophy for normative ethics whereas social values are treated by the social sciences in some form of moral sociology. In that sense, the difference would lie in the methodological perspective.

We then raised the question what European values are. By drawing from the idea that values originate in experiences, we listed joint experiences of Europeans that played a role in the genesis of European values. We also asked about the relationship of these European values to those in the official European documents and those values Europeans actually hold and that can be collected by surveys.

With regard to values in S&T, we advanced the hypothesis that in EC and its S&T governance the shift to concepts of enabling and values is accompanied by a side-lining of ethics in a specific sense. The latter would here obviously be seen (and at least partly falsely so) as a restrictive and permanent trouble-maker. As ethics amongst other things is about analysing and criticising actions and institutions with regard to their moral rightness or goodness, its judgements can indeed restrict and limit the range of possible actions (but it can also open new perspectives and horizons). With regard to the specific understanding of ethics as troublemaker, the reference to attractive values seems more promising. We discussed this

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hypothesis also with regard to the governance approach in the social sciences. In analogy to neo-classical theory in economics, this approach progressively regarded policies as an emerging social order that does not need government nor a predefined normative goal. Governance appears to be a comparatively soft substitute to state and government that somehow also leads to welfare and a good order. The proximity to market processes is obvious. Against this background, it seemed very plausible that governance approaches refer to values rather than to ethics. Values make actions possible; one can relate to them without feeling an urgent need to do or leave anything. Ethics, on the contrary, might interfere with the help norms that could regulate or limit sectoral or policy-related interaction processes. Based on Claus Offe (2008, p. 73) we stated that if politics has to cope with a complex situation that reduced the effectivity of hierarchical modes of governing, the success of policies does not only depend on voluntaristic networks but also on the citizens which have to understand, support, endure and participate consciously and deliberately. That exactly is the direction Value Isobars is heading.

3. Values and evaluations

The following chapter continues terminological questions already raised in D1 when we differentiated values from rules (norm, institution, and principle), virtues, desires, interests, and preferences. Building on this definitional work, we go further into the relationship of values, attitudes and preferences. In this respect, what is of interest is the relationship between values and evaluations. We understand preferences and attitudes as some forms of evaluations.

We have already learnt that values and evaluations are interrelated. On the one hand, values arise from strong evaluations. Individuals make experiences which they qualify and articulate. This individual articulation of a qualified experience is emotionally integrated, historically and culturally contingent and differs in its intersubjective meaning and normative content. The permanent interaction between individuals and groups results in socially intermediated reflective standards of the desirable (Jung 2007, p. 71; Taylor 1985, p. 18-21). In their formation, values originate from single evaluations, become detached and grammatically condensed in a noun. While this detachment from single evaluations and the conversion to nouns allow for disambiguation and abstraction, the generality of values results in a relative distance from experience and content-related vagueness. These abstracted values can travel to different contexts. However, they can also become contested because we do not always know what they mean in specific situations (Mandry 2009, pp. 158-9). On the other hand, values are reference points of evaluations and serve as criteria for evaluations. From this point of view, evaluations are not identical with values but build on and point to them.² The academic literature distinguishes two categories of evaluative judgements (Grüne-Yanoff; Hansson 2009, pp. 160-1, Schnädelbach 2000/1, pp. 158-162): a classificatory concept that evaluates a single action, object etc. (e.g. “A is good/ bad.”) and a comparative concept that compares two objects according to some value (e.g. “A is least as good/ bad as B.” or “A is better than B.”).

² In D3, we will therefore explore whether there is on the level of justification a status of values that is neither value objectivist nor value subjectivist but that allows for some degree of objective values.

3.1. Values and attitudes

Several scientific reports concluded that social values can be seen as central drivers for people's attitudes towards S&T (CEC 2005, Eurobarometer 2005). For instance, in 2005 a Report of the Science Policy Research Group to the European Commission made the claim “that values are one of the key and unexplored parameters responsible for changing attitudes on science and technology. Values provide common identity and visions, they stimulate positive or negative attitudes, and their conflict is experienced as major obstacle to action.” (CEC 2005, p. 5) Those reports see a causal relationship between (social) values and attitudes. In order to analyse the relationship of values and attitudes, we first have to define the term attitude itself. Academic literature on attitudes tells us, that this is no easy endeavour as there is a multitude of different definitions. What unites all of them is that attitudes are in one way or another related to evaluations (Banaji/Heiphetz 2010, p. 351; Haddock/Maio 2007, p. 200). Haddock/Maio (2007, p. 190) understand by attitude the “overall evaluation of a stimulus object”. A stimulus object can be “anything a person may hold in mind, ranging from the mundane to the abstract, including things, people, groups, and ideas” (Bohner/Dickel 2011, p. 392). Therefore, stimulus objects can be abstract objects such as S&T or concrete objects such as CCTV cameras. Persons can have an attitude to themselves (self-esteem or self-hatred), to other people such as scientists, to groups of people such as politicians or to socio-political questions such as pathogen research.

We (WP2 Deliverable 1, p. 4) suggested regarding the relationship between both as such: “Values can be thought of as more general concerns, or ‘organising principles’, that give structure to various attitudes. As such, values might be understood as a latent dimension underlying attitudes.” Understanding values as a dimension that underlies and structures attitudes is a fruitful starting point. However, talking about values and attitudes is a challenging business as they both may form part of different language-games³. Both can be false friends in different scientific languages. The term “attitude” originates from (social) psychology and does not have a tradition and strong standing in philosophy and (normative) ethics (Strohal 1972, col. 417). While attitudes are used in social and moral psychology to describe, explain and predict behaviour, values in normative ethics serve to justify and give reason for action. Nevertheless, both are related to evaluations: An influential definition understands attitudes as “a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor” (Eagly/Chaiken 2005, p. 745). In D1, we suggested that values are best being regarded as reference points of evaluations. However, while empirical research on attitudes asks e.g. for the valence, strength or stability of attitudes (regardless of their moral justification) in order to explain and predict behaviour, philosophical considerations on values ask whether actions conform to values or whether values themselves are acceptable in the light of the moral good or the normative right (regardless of the explanatory or predictive power). Admittedly, one might be faced with both sides. A researcher who investigates attitudes that support racist prejudices might hold the opinion that those attitudes are morally wrong and contradictory to values such as equality or tolerance. In this example, the researcher deals with evaluations expressed by others in attitudes to people of another race as well as those expressed by himself in evaluating the moral rightness or goodness of the investigated attitudes. But s/he does so in different ways (empirically vs. normatively) and with different aims (explain and predict vs. evaluate, criticise or justify). This has to be borne in mind in order to avoid confusion that can be

³ We thank our colleague Ralf Lutz for this insight.

fuelled by the academic literature on attitudes. While earlier scholarly works such as that of Milton Rokeach or Daniel Katz explicitly dealt with attitudes and their relationship to values, more recent works seem to have lost this from sight. Latter focus mainly on the relationship of attitudes to beliefs, behaviour, and affect (cf. Albarracin/ Johnson/ Zanna 2005, Jonas/ Stroebe/ Hewstone 2007).

With regard to the content and structure of attitudes, the “multicomponent model of attitude” has been an influential way of thinking (Banaji/Heiphetz 2010, p. 350; Haddock/Maio 2007, p. 190). This model “conceptualizes attitudes as summary evaluations that have affective, cognitive and behavioural components” (Haddock/Maio 2007, p. 190).

- The affective component encompasses the “feelings or emotions associated with an attitude object” (Haddock/Maio 2007, p. 190).
- The cognitive component contains “thoughts, beliefs and attributes associated with an attitude object” (ibid., p. 192).
- The behavioural component includes “past behaviours associated with an attitude object” (ibid., p. 193).

Eagly/Chaiken (2007, p. 745) argue that “attitudes can be formed through cognitive, affective, and behavioral processes and expressed through cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses”. Formation and expression of attitudes are hence influenced by affections, cognitions and behaviour. This is not the place to explore the three components in detail. There are two related aspects, however, we would like to highlight. It has been mentioned, that cognitions, i.e. what we think or believe about the state of the world, influence our attitudes. For their formation only those cognitions are relevant that are consciously accessible to an individual. This “property of stimuli in relation to perceivers that causes them to attract attention” (Haddock/Maio 2007, p. 193) is called *salience*. When it comes to intra-attitudinal structure, this aspect will be important. Another relevant aspect is the *self-perception theory* that “assumes that individuals often do not know their own attitudes and, like outside observers, have to engage in attributional reasoning [i.e. giving reasons for own’s own behaviour (SM/TP)] to infer their attitudes from their own behaviour” (ibid.). We have to assess in what way this theory can be made productive for an ethics of values that amongst others aims for a linguistic articulation of experience-based, but implicit and emotionally integrated value contents.

Social psychological research not only dealt with the question of different attitude components but also with their mutual relationship (Haddock/Maio 2007, p. 195). It is about how positive and negative evaluations are organised within and between the affective, cognitive and behavioural components. How do positive and negative evaluation relate to each other? Do they exclude each other? That would be the *one-dimensional perspective of attitudes*, “that perceives positive and negative elements as stored along a single dimension” (ibid). The *two-dimensional perspective*, on the other hand, “perceives positive and negative elements as stored along separate dimensions” (ibid.). One dimension expresses if and to what extent there are positive elements, while the other one shows the same with negative elements. In contrast to the one-dimensional perspective, this perspective highlights that attitudes can encompass many positive and negative elements on the same stimulus object. This can lead to *attitudinal ambivalence* that is “an instance where an individual both likes and dislikes an attitude object” (ibid).

The two-dimensional perspective seems more appropriate to deal with ambivalence and to explain behaviour that on the surface appears strange and contradictory (Haddock/Maio 2007, p. 196-8). Let's imagine that we ask people for their attitudes to e.g. pathogen research and to indicate it on a scale from 1 (extremely negative) to 9 (extremely positive). 5 would be neutral (neither positive nor negative) and a compromise between the two extremes. This middle position could be interpreted that people have many positive and negative cognitions, affects, and behaviours with regard to pathogen research or that they have none because they did not have any experience with it. For empirical attitude research, this is an important insight as it allows predicting many different types of behaviour. Individuals that are ambivalent to an attitude object will be influenced more likely by salient positive or negative attributes than non-ambivalent individuals (*attribute polarisation*). Research also showed that attitudes can be “unfrozen” via self-reflection without resulting in attribute polarisation (Wilson 1990, p. 63): “People adopt a new attitude based on a set of criteria that become salient when they analyze reasons [...]” (ibid, p. 62). It was also shown that experiments based on theoretical assumptions which view individuals as “rational compilers of information” led to undesired consequences (lowered attitude-behaviour-consistency, reduced post-choice satisfaction) as they ignored that attitudes are also influenced by factors such as core values or past behaviour (Wilson 1990, p. 62). For Value Isobars, the question of attitude ambivalence hence is of great interest.

Attitude research also dealt with the question why people built attitudes at all. One answer stresses “the psychological need fulfilled by an attitude” (*attitude function*) (ibid, p. 199). We will not enter the discussion of the different models by e.g. Smith et al. (1956) or Katz (1960) but just present the different functions Katz proposed as they still seem have some appeal in social psychology today (Banaji/Heiphetz 2010, p. 351):

- *Utilitarian* attitudes “help individuals obtain rewards and avoid punishments”.
- *Knowledge* attitudes “allow an understanding of the situations in which one finds oneself”.
- *Ego-defensive* attitudes “protect the individual from psychic threats”. Related expressions can be prejudices or self-esteem.
- *Value-expressive* attitudes “help individuals express their core values or foundational aspects of themselves [...] These attitudes may be inherently rewarding insofar as expressing one's core values is gratifying. Just such a process may be at work in the process of self-affirmation, which among other consequences demonstrates the power of value-expression to diminish feelings of self-threat [...]. Value-expressive attitudes are privileged in other ways as well; research has shown that such attitudes are particularly resistant to change [...] and promote commitment to relevant behaviors”.

Haddock/Maio (2007, p. 200) suggest organising the academic literature on attitude functions along two lines: (1) object appraisal and (2) distinction between instrumental and value-expressive attitudes. They first conclude that all attitudes serve the function of object evaluation. This function encompasses Katz' utilitarian and knowledge function. Individuals would hence classify stimulus objects in order to be able to act. The evaluation function helps to accelerate and facilitates the performance of attitude-relevant evaluations. Gordon W. Allport (1935, p. 806), one of the founding fathers of attitude research, called attitudes “our methods for finding our way about in an ambiguous universe”.

Haddock/Maio (2007, p. 200, 202) also advocate the distinction between instrumental and value-expressive attitudes. The first ones serve an instrumental function in the sense that stimulus objects are classified whether or not they further individual interests. Value-expressive functions become visible when one's own self-conception or values are at stake. Research on these two functions revealed that, first, stimuli objects induce attitudes related primarily to either the instrumental or the value-expressive function and that, second, people get convinced by arguments that conform with this primary function.

What do we learn from this for Value Isobars? Above, we mentioned a definition that understands by attitude the “overall evaluation of a stimulus object” (Haddock/Maio 2007, p. 190). Eagly/Chaiken (2007, p. 745), in comparison, stress that evaluations are

“not synonymous with attitude itself. Attitude is a tendency or latent property of the person that gives rise to judgements and categorizations, as well as many other types of responses such as emotions and overt behaviors”.

For them attitudes are “the evaluative residue of past experience” and originate “on the basis of some transactions with the environment” (ibid.). According to Banaji/Heiphetz (2010, p. 366) attitudes “derive from different parts of the social world, from the words and behaviors of other beings, and from the events that unfold in the world”. An individual needs to encounter an attitude object and to distinguish it as a discriminable entity in order to build an attitude. This can happen with or without conscious awareness. While encountering an attitude object the individual responds to it on an explicit or implicit basis. This response leaves a mental residue in the individual that predisposes him or her to an (un-)favourable on subsequent encounters (Eagly/Chaiken 2007, p. 745). This residue is “an intervening state that hypothetically accounts for the covariation between stimuli relevant to the attitude object and the evaluative responses elicited by these stimuli” (ibid.).

Distinguishing attitudes from evaluation opens up linkages to the value debate. Values also originate from evaluations but are not identical with them. In D1, we stated that evaluations relate to values in a way that they are referred to as criteria, ideals and moral standards that are detached and articulated independently from single evaluations (Mandry 2009, pp. 162-164). It seems that attitudes and values originate both from evaluations made in a moment of experience and that both have an orientating function. There are, however, substantial differences. While values are in a way still related to types of action contexts, they are by far more abstract and removed from the evaluated situations or things than attitudes are. As mentioned above, both belong to different language-games. Different social sciences use the term attitude in order to describe or explain individual behaviour or action. In moral philosophy, values serve as reference points for evaluations and are understood as something people submit to and in accordance with which they design and determine their lives. Values justify and legitimise action.

Our discussion of attitude-value-relationship might also help to re-think and sharpen the starting point of Value Isobars. The project (Value Isobars 2009, p. 5) starts off with an observation of ambivalence:

“Attitudes among European citizens to new science and technology are typically ambivalent. On the one hand, there is evidence of a fundamentally positive attitude to knowledge and technological innovation, while on the other hand there is equally strong evidence that many current developments raise serious concerns and doubts.”

As a consortium, we might ask where this ambivalence stems from. If people react ambiguously to, say, pathogen research, is it because they have many positive or negative cognitions, emotions and behaviours with this kind of research or related fields of research or because they have none? We also have to bear in mind that some people might have primarily either instrumental or value-expressive attitudes with regard to S&T. Can we interpret that as ambivalence or is it a regular, even harmless statistical distribution within a society? With regard to a value dialogue, this might imply different ways of persuasion. What it also shows is that an ethics of values and value dialogues can not restrict itself solely to philosophical disambiguation and rational argumentation. It also has to find ways to deal with emotions, cognitions and behaviours. Attitude research also showed that attitudes are influenced by diverse factors. Value Isobars regards values as central drivers for people's attitudes to S&T. In order to understand and penetrate basic concepts, we have to consider the relationship of values to these other factors such as past behaviours, reasons etc.

3.2 Values and preferences

Very often values and preferences are used synonymously. We argue, however, that they are different. As we already mentioned, values and evaluations are not the same. Preferences are a form of evaluation and therefore they cannot be values themselves. According to Grüne-Yanoff/Hansson (2009b, p. 8/9), a preference

“expresses a relational value judgement. It is relational in the sense that it connects two or more relata. These relata may be propositions expressing states of affairs, events, etc. or they may be bundles of goods. Preference is a value judgement in the sense that it compares relata with respect to (some aspect of) their value. There are two fundamental comparative value concepts, namely “better” (strict preference) and “equal in value to” (indifference).“

Jung highlights that evaluations not only represent preferences but that they also evaluate them in the light of possible alternatives (Jung 2007, p. 71). In D1, we already stated that values and preferences cannot be used synonymously as we evaluate desires, preferences or interests on the basis of values. We also discussed that this has caused great problems for adherents of Utilitarianism (understood as a moral theory), namely to explain where our preferences come from. More normativist-orientated social scientists have been more relaxed on this issue, as they focussed explicitly on values and their importance for human action and distinguished clearly between values, norms and preferences. They faced different problems though, especially because they could not explain how individuals act according to values. Normativist-orientated approaches regard values as cognitive scripts and moral templates that were internalised in socialisation processes and that become taken-for-granted and therefore invisible. It remains unclear how we refer to them actively and reactively when faced with new situations (Joas 2000, pp.12-19; Joas 2005, Hall/Taylor 1996, pp. 946-950).

Fritz W. Scharpf (1997) suggests to regard actors as being capable for strategic action. They act rationally, calculating their gains and losses but within an institutional framework that influences their choices but without completely determining it. For empirical research, he suggests dividing preference into four components: basic self-interest, normative role orientations, identity, and interaction orientation. Scharpf understands the first two components in a quasi objective way. By *basic self-interest*, he means “the basic preference of actors for self-preservation, autonomy, and growth” (ibid., p. 64) and by *normative role*

orientation the “normative expectations addressed to the occupants of given social functions” (ibid.). With regard to *identity*, he (Scharpf 1997, p. 65) states that actors

“have the possibility of defining specific interests and norms for themselves, and [...] they may selectively emphasize certain aspects of self-interest as well as certain rules and normative purposes from among those that generally apply to individuals or organizations of their type. In other words, actors have the possibility of defining a specific identity, which, if adhered to, will simplify their own choices and which, when communicated and believed, reduces uncertainty for other actors (and for researchers as well)”.

Finally, with *interaction orientations* he pays tribute to the fact that there are preferences that are defined relationally, i.e. paying attention to the relationship actors have with their fellow actors and that determine their choices. It is interesting for Value Isobars, that with evaluations we have to consider contextual parameters.

3.3 Summary

To sum up, values on the one hand and preferences and attitudes on the other hand, are not on the same analytical level. However, values, attitudes and preferences are all related to evaluations. Values originate in strong evaluations, but get detached from single evaluations. Values as nouns then become the reference points for evaluations.

Attitudes and preferences are related to values in different ways. Attitudes are the tendency to evaluate, not the evaluation itself. As mental sets, attitudes determine the way people evaluate a stimulus object. Preferences are part of a comparative value concept that compares objects according to some value. Therefore, they need one or more values as criteria to build preference lists. Both, attitudes and preference can be evaluated on the basis of values. While attitudes and preferences influence and structure actions, the terms themselves are normatively undetermined. Reference to values allows for ethical considerations such as argumentation, reflectivity and justification.

4. Value-based governance in EU S&T policy

Value Isobars identifies the need to bring governance and public policy more in line with European values (Value Isobars 2009, p. 4). This, however, could mean different things:

- Rules might be checked whether they are in line with European values (*Value-Norm-Comparison*).
- Rule-setting might be checked whether it is in line with European values. Here, in difference to a material check, the procedure of rule-setting can be looked at whether it conforms to European values (*Ethics of value debate*). One approach the philosophically challenging task of translating a plurality of values into rules (*Value-Norm-Translation*).
- Both former approaches will most likely be faced with value conflicts that have to be resolved (*Ethics of values*). Here, two tasks are relevant. First, a closer look at the content of a value is necessary in order to understand and clarify its meaning. It might be possible that different groups of people hold the same value but fill it with different meanings. The second task would be to trade-off conflicting values.

From this, we can deduce three challenges: (1) an ethics of values that deals with value contents and value conflict, (2) an ethics of value debates that contemplates how speaking on values can be productive, and (3) value-norm-comparison and -translation.

In the following, we will first assess the relationship of values and norms. As already mentioned, this is not only a matter of academic interest, but also basic for Value Isobars, as it wants to improve norm-setting in EU governance of S&T. We then sketch an ethics of values, as this will be the place to discuss how to deal with value conflicts and value-norm-translations. Finally, we return to the question of European values.

4.1 Values and norms

As Value Isobars aims to produce a blue-print for a value-based governance of S&T, the relationship of values and norms is of crucial importance. We want to come from a plurality of values held by Europeans of different age, gender, race or class to norms that are binding to everybody regardless of the individual attitude to those norms. To values, individuals feel committed and bound as they are part of their identity. It is therefore challenging to translate motivating values into norms.

D1 already analysed the relationship between values and norms. Therefore we first want to give a short reminder of those results. We said that norms are more or less generalised rules or instructions with respect to expected actions of defined groups of social actors or to the expected performances of a specific activity (Ott 2006, p. 474, Streeck/ Thelen 2005, p. 9). Typically, norms can be analysed with regard to its components (Ott 2006, pp. 475-80): According to the *type of norms* they can be classified as technical, epistemic, conventional, legal and moral norms that in everyday life are found in the form of technological standards, customs, laws, and commandments. Value Isobars is specially interested in legal (“hard and soft law”) and moral norms. The *character of norms* refers to their content which arises from the combination of behavioural modes with a so called *deontic operator*. The deontic operator is based on moral basic modalities: allow, forbid, have a right, ought to. Norms are directed to different social groups (norm *addressees*): Who is supposed to follow the rule (moral agents)? Who are the people affected by the instructed action (moral patients)? Some strict moral commitments are universally binding for all members of a community (moral community), whereas some norms refer to specific social roles (physicians, lawyers etc.), goods (nature, security) or contexts (sport, politics etc.) (*specification of a norm*). Usually, it also specifies *exception (prima facie-) clauses, sanctions* and an *authority* to enforce a norm.

Nonetheless, there are different possibilities of how specific or universal they can be formulated, interpreted and applied (Düwell, Hübenthal, Werner 2006, p. 15; Ott 1998, p. 348). Norms are directly aimed to regulate action; they are more or less context specific and can specify affected groups of people. Values on the contrary are rather general and they lack the specific deontic operator to regulate behaviour immediately and effectively. Values need, and are linked to, social norms for a situational application. This means conversely that norms in one way or the other are always based on values (Schäfers 2008, p. 37; Schnädelbach 1983, p. 201). Norms tell what to do in a specific context. By knowing how to act in a specific situation, we are enabled for action. A value, however, does not tell us what to do in a specific situation. It makes action possible by providing orientation and motivation for action, though without saying what to do in specific contexts. With regard to values, it is useful to view them as something that attracts us.

To sum up, values are not rules in the sense of practical, context-sensitive instructions that specify situations, actions, agents, nor do they include deontic operators. Values enable action without demanding a specific (course of) action (Bockrath 1998, p. 380). They attract us and motivate our action. The gap between value and action can be and has to be bridged by norms.

4.2 Ethics of values

WP1 is intended, among others, to suggest parameters for a pragmatically justified theory of values for governance. With regard to an ethics of values, we proceed with a dual approach. First, we advance into more basic philosophical considerations what an ethics of value might look like. As Value Isobars aims at a more value-based and value-informed governance of S&T, our main focus in WP1 lays on how we can come from a plurality of values that have to do with the self-conception of individuals and groups to norms that have an obligatory character. Among others, governance aims at the regulation of policies by means of certain norms such as hard or soft law. In this respect, Pahl-Wostl/Toonen (2009, p. 8) provide a useful understanding of governance that they describe as

“setting the stage for management, the process of selecting policy options among competing values, translating them into goals, means and processes to be 'managed', evaluating outcomes and accounting externally, and taking responsibility for choices made along the way”.

An ethics of values can provide the basis for such policy-processes, by showing how values can be applied to contexts of action. It intends to open the black box of values and looks at their content. Understanding the meanings of a value creates common grounds for all participants in value dialogues. This assists in translating a value into a norm as well as solving value conflicts.

A good point of departure to illustrate what an ethics of values has to deal with is the notion of value conflict. By it, we distinguish two phenomena: intra- and inter-value-conflict. *Intra-value-conflict* basically describes different understandings of the same value. Take the value of family in the following simplistic, but illustrative example: An urban Dutch lesbian couple and a rural Polish heterosexual couple might both agree that family is an important value but they might both disagree on many content-related aspects. One can also observe changes over time. In Germany of the 1950s, family meant a heterosexual couple with their biological children. During the last years, however, the concept of family changed and an alternative definition emerged: a family is the place, where children live, regardless of descent and legal parenthood. If family policy is to be thought more value-based, the meanings of certain values play an important role. *Inter-value-conflict* describes the conflict between two or more values. In public debates, many of those conflicts can be found such as the tension between security and freedom or privacy. Some of these debates refer to value pluralism and the impossibility to reach common grounds that goes beyond a statement or acceptance of differences.

Therefore, translation of values into norms faces at least three challenges (Mandry 2009, pp. 179-80; Joas 2007; Mieth 2005, p. 26-30): (1) dealing with different value traditions, (2) evaluating the worth of values, (3) applying values to contexts.

(1) An ethics of values asks for the emotions, experiences and narratives associated with values. However, this is not meant to lead to a compilation of different stories that unrelatedly stand next to each other. An ethics of values intends to go beyond that by asking how we can

introduce values into a value discourse. We think that this can be achieved by what Joas (2007, 2008) called “value generalisation”, a concept that builds on the works of Talcott Parsons and means a process of mutual modification of value traditions (Joas 2007, p. 33). Joas regards his approach as a third way between two opposite positions. The first position assumes a clash of values, identities or cultures that does not allow for a rational discourse. The second position is associated with Jürgen Habermas who regards values as particularist. Therefore, for Habermas “there can be no such thing as a universalist value orientation which means that all hope for universalization lies in the spheres of law and morality in a normative sense” (Joas 2008, p. 89/90). Building on Parsons, Joas (2008, p. 94) states that

“different value traditions can indeed produce a more general, mostly also more abstract understanding of their common features *without* losing their roots in the specific traditions and experiences to which actors feel affectually committed. In its current articulation a value maybe the result of a particular cultural tradition – human rights, for example, are claimed to be a result of the Judaeco-Christian tradition or of the Enlightenment – but this does not mean that other cultural and religious traditions cannot be reinterpreted, or rather, cannot reinterpret themselves in view of this articulation of a value so that their own potential to articulate this same value comes to light.”

This value generalisation deals with three challenges (Joas 2008, pp. 90-92). It is first faced with strong emotions that are related to values. There are second aspects of values that are immune against empirical falsification: “When our basic values are affected, our reaction with regard to doubt or the person articulating this doubt will often not be the modification of our conviction, but a devaluation or derogation of that person.” (Joas 2008, p. 91). Third, arguing for values requires telling stories and myths about experiences that led to these values. In this context, Joas refers to Putnam, who stressed that values go together to value sets, and adds a temporal, narrative dimension.

(2) In a way, it is a demanding business to evaluate the worth of a value. It first needs an understanding of the specific content of a value. What is meant by freedom or security? Value generalisation can contribute much in this respect. An ethics of value can then try to evaluate a value by referring to Neo-Aristotelian or deontological ethics. In the first case, it can be asked in what way a value can contribute to a good and successful live or political order. In the second case, it would be checked whether or not a value conforms to higher norms or principles such as human dignity.

By applying both ethical approaches, we can approach value conflicts. On the one hand an ethics of values can try to trade-off values in a way that they contribute to a good and successful life. On the other hand it can develop practically-oriented principles that make value-led actions possible. The social ethicist Dietmar Mieth (2005, pp. 26-30), for example, formulated principles along deontological lines that are meant to allow a value-based progress in S&T and economy:

- Act in such a way that you respect the rights and duties of all participants (i.e. yourself and all other) in a context of action.
- Act in such a way that acting according to our principles does not overturn these principles.
- Responsibility without ethos is empty; ethos without responsibility is blind for the consequences.
- Do not solve problems in a way that the problems resulting from problem-solving are bigger than the problems that had to be solved.

- If we give an end to our actions and want to be efficient, we have to pay attention that efficiency does not overturn human ends.

These principles do not refer to a specific set of values but allow for ways to deal with value conflicts in a rational way. It is assumed that people have value commitments.

(3) ‘Applying’ values also means that one needs to be informed on the context, interaction, situation etc. those values have to be related to. The closer one gets to contexts the more a value translation will be determined by pragmatic and efficiency reasons. It seems therefore reasonable not to deal with value conflicts in abstract (such as freedom vs. security in general) but look at it in context (freedom vs. security with regard to a specific technology in the EU). In that sense, the ideas of a value map or atlas gains importance by bringing in this necessary contextual information.

The value-norm-relationship can also be seen the other way round. As rules never entirely match all aspects of a value or value sets, one can use this value surplus to check a norm. By locating a norm in a value set or a moral map one can ask whether it contributes to realise values or rather goes contrary to those values.

4.3 European values

If we want bring governance more in line with European values, we have to face the question what European values are. In D1, we raised that question and suggested three different meanings.

1. Are European values the values European citizens hold and that could empirically be gathered by surveys or participatory means? It would be the task of social psychology or moral sociology to collect the data and transfer it to policy-makers.
2. European values can be understood as those values that can be derived from a European master narrative. Historians, philosophers and other hermeneutical sciences to read the values out of European history and of experiences that constituted a European public.
3. European values can be understood as the values in official European documents. One simply has to look into those texts that were written and accepted by the elected representatives of the European citizens. In those documents, the democratic sovereign declares how and according to which principles it wants to perceive and constitute itself as a society. The paradigmatic case would be the preamble of the US constitution: “We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.” (US Senate). In principle, the same applies to the European treaties.

Things will get more complex, if one also checks whether or not actions of European citizens and of European institutions conform to expressed values or if they are guided by other values. Social psychology differentiates here between expressed values that people explicitly claim relevant for their lives, and revealed values that show in their action.

One can finally ask whether European values have a prescriptive function. If Europeans hold certain values (that reveal in their actions) one can say that they feel bound to these values. In

this respect, they are prescriptive. The case is somewhat different with the values in the European documents. Being part of the European treaties and therefore of European law they can be understood as authoritative and binding for EU citizens and policies. However, the content of specific values is still vague and needs interpretation. The exact prescriptive function remains therefore unclear. In line with previously made observations, one can regard them as motivators for action and general focus points for evaluations.

For the purpose of an ethics of values one does not have to solve the problems which of those options really are the European values. In a way, they are all European values – and it remains an empirical question whether or not there are in the end significant differences between the three options. More important for the purpose of getting to value-based governance is what follows from the fact that some values are declared to be the values in play for a certain policy. It is not self-evident that values gained in surveys or participatory processes are directly fed into rule-setting. By means of value generalisation and a value-norm-translation, we have to make explicit the content of values that are meant to guide politics and policy and to give them the structure of a norm but we also have to check the moral validity of those values.

5. Conclusions and outlook

This deliverable presents some educated thoughts the issues presented. It has already incorporated some outcome of debates of the consortium members of Value Isobars in the aftermath of D1. In a further step we will continue on the ethics of value debates and the value-norm-translation, building on outcomes of the second deliverables of the other work-packages and the second communication to end-users (second synthesis paper)

As a further outlook, we provide the components of a pragmatically justified theory of values for governance from the perspective of WP1:

- ethical part: crucial question of value-norm translation: how to come from attractive values to restrictive norms.
- interdisciplinary part: bring insights together with governance approach in general and to governance of S&T in the EU in particular.
- apply to S&T governance and here to one example of each test case: biometrics and dual use pathogen research

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